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Points of Praxis

My Blog Reflects on Visual Rhetorical Theory and Disability Rhetoric and their Connections to Classical and Contemporary Rhetorical Theory

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Friday, January 05, 2007

Some good points to remember:

Daniel Chandler writes in The Basics: Semiotics, "From Plato to Levi-Strauss, the spoken word has held a privileged position in the Western worldview, being regarded as intimately involved in our sense of self and constituting a sign of truth and authenticity" (51).

Helmers and Hill discuss the scope and importance of studies in visual rhetoric and the "seemingly infinite range of possibilities for those who are interested in studying rhetorical transactions of all kinds" (21).

Saussure's theory of opposites--knowing what "it" is by what "it" isn't. Going back to semoitics, deletion is a syntagmatic (surface-level) transformation that shapes the constructed meaning of a sign, also.

images or visuals are not argument or persuasion; rather, the contexts in which images are placed make them persuasive, rhetoric, or argumentative. [Mitchell agrees w/ this statement in Picture Theory and Paul Messaris in Visual Literacy would argue that we've been trained to see images as visually persuasive or an argument]

"the visual brings to arguments another dimension entirely. It adds drama and force of a much greater order" (Hill and Helmers 59).

Barry argues that emotional responses are a priori to rational understanding. I'm thinking here of her discussion on page 18 of how we begin to respond emotionally to situations before we begin to *think* through them.

"Information that is expressed either in visual form or in a verbal form that promotes the construction of mental images is more likely to instantiate these emotions and to be given additional persuasive weight" (36).

images can even be used to prompt sustained, analytic thinking. Images, like verbal text, can be used to prompt an immediate, visceral response, to develop cognitive (though largely unconscious) connections over a sustained period of time, or to prompt conscious analytical thought" (Hill 37).

Eco writes that meaning is constructed through equivalence and inference: meaning is constructed by understanding what something is similar to (equivalence) or what it could be, specifically "If/Then" scenarios (inference). However, meaning or content is a cultural unit positioned within a system (31). Meaning isn't constructed devoid of contexts. Signs are dynamic and changing "objects" that motivates and are motivated by other signs. Abductive reasoning then is similar to the "snake eating its tail" metaphor that Barry describes in Chapter 2 on page 87.

So, whereas inductive reasoning begins with the specific and formulates the rule based on the specific, abductive reasoning also includes the rule to formulate the specific (I hope this makes sense). It reminds me of Barry's discussion on visual perception and expectations. (We think we see an old woman in the picture. After knowing it's a from a book on the elderly, we know it's a picture of an old woman.) The specific creates the rule, but the rule also in turn creates the specific.

Alright, so how does all of this relate back to Barry? I was reminded of Eco time and time again in her discussion on the various influences on perception--for example, the influences from our senses. Specifically, Barry writes that "visual, verbal and mental images, tied to our experience of and in the world, are nevertheless experientially related--whether they reflect the superficial appearance of the world or a mental images abstracted from it" (Barry 74).

The ways in which we construct meaning or perceive the world isn't simply input-in, output-out. Or, "the eye is not a passive camera, so images are never merely replicas, but often reflect deep and significant processes in the psyche" (Barry 76). Just as Eco argued that we can't neglect the circular nature of "knowledge," we can't forget the role of the "observer" who doesn't just observe passively: "When the mind of the observer is ignored, the transcendent power of analogy is likewise nullified" (Barry 77).

Eco echos (pun intended) Barry's point that perception occurs through multiple stimuli. Barry writes, "Meaningfulness was to be found in the reaction among the elements and in the relationship which formed a unified whole, not in the separate parts themselves" (Barry 44).

In Janis L. Edwards' article, she discusses the nation's collective memories of JFK, his assassination, and the accidental death of his son, John F. Kennedy, Jr., specifically, arguing that the coverage of John, Jr.'s death was mythically connected through collective memory to that of JFK's funeral and John, Jr.'s "salute." This photograph, of John, Jr. "saluting" his father funeral procession, became an iconic symbol of the contrasts between "innocent idealism with violent reality" (184).

However, what I find interesting are the ways in which such iconic images become part of the collective memories of viewers--viewers who never saw the "actual" event but only remember it through photographs and film footage. Daniel Chambers defines "iconic" as "a mode in which the signifier is perceived as resembling or imitating the signified (recognizably looking, sounding, feeling, tasting or smelling like it)" (229). In other words, the iconic image is one that seems to "realistically" reflect its referent; the image of John, Jr. saluting is iconic because it reflects accurately what happened in November 1963.

However, I believe that collective memories often create these iconic images. After all, how many "remember" seeing John, Jr. salute his father's funeral procession? Or, "remember" seeing the Challenger explode on January 28, 1986? And, while these memories seem ingrained in our collective consciousness, Marita Struken discusses in her book _Tangled Memories_ that collective memories are often forged. Often times, we "remember" the events like they happened, even though we never actually saw them with our own eyes at the moment they occurred. Looking at Edwards' discussion in light of Struken's, I would argue then that because these collective memories don't actually reflect "reality" or what we really saw, they become symbolic images--or images that "does not resemble the signified but which is arbitrary or purely conventional, so that the relationship must be learned" (243). In other words, I recognize the image of John, Jr. saluting because I've learned over the numerous occasions that I saw it on television that that's what it is. I never saw it happen myself--it's only a symbolic image for me. Not an iconic one. If some images are "symbolic" and others are "iconic" this leaves much more to discuss in regard to images and collective memories. How much of what we know and understand is really authentic? Seeing isn't necessarily knowing. Therefore, collective memories and symbolic images are falable, chaotic, and dynamic.


Foss's application of print rhetorical theories to visual artifacts. Specifically, Foss begins her discussion on the rhetorical tradition of priviledging linguistic artifacts over visual (303). Although Foss doesn't mention Plato, I was reminded of Plato's criticism of print texts over memory. Memory relies on linguistic "tricks" whereas print texts are essentially linguistic texts in a visual form. Print texts are visual rhetoric, in some regard.

Also, much of Foss's theory is based on classical rhetorical theories; she discusses how artifacts function as "metaphor, argument, enthymeme, ethos, evidence, narrative, and stasis" (308).  Foss also discusses two approaches to visual rhetorical criticism: inductive and deductive applications. Even Foss article, presented at the end of the book, is a deductive approach to visual rhetorical theory. The authors present their interpretations of various visual media and artifacts, and Foss presents a method for analyzing such artifacts (just like the method she discusses in her section on deductive applications).

I think Foss is giving scholars a "do-able" approach to visual rhetorical theory. But, I wonder if, as Foss notes, visual rhetoric is a "relevant, inclusive, and holistic [view] of contemporary symbol use" (313) and field of study that requires different, inclusive, non-linear rhetorical approaches, whether framing her discussion in a classical rhetorical tradition is the way to achieve this? To answer my own question, I would have to say that there has to be a place to begin. If visual rhetoric is still an emerging field that is often "bastardized" in more traditional English departments, then connecting visual rhetoric to the classical rhetorical tradition would help legitamize the field.

posted by: rgregory at 04:30 | link | comments |

Wednesday, January 03, 2007

Some humorous comments about professors at Ratemyprofessor.com
  • You can't cheat in her class because no one knows the answers.
  • His class was like milk, it was good for 2 weeks.
  • Houston, we have a problem. Space cadet of a teacher, isn't quite attached to earth.
  • I would have been better off using the tuition money to heat my apartment last winter.
  • Three of my friends got A's in his class and my friends are dumb.
  • Emotional scarring may fade away, but that big fat F on your transcript won't.
  • Evil computer science teaching robot who crushes humans for pleasure.
  • Miserable professor - I wish I could sum him up without foul language.
  • Instant amnesia walking into this class. I swear he breathes sleeping gas.
  • BORING! But I learned there are 137 tiles on the ceiling.
  • Not only is the book a better teacher, it also has a better personality.
  • Teaches well, invites questions and then insults you for 20 minutes.
  • This teacher was a firecracker in a pond of slithery tadpoles.
  • I learned how to hate a language I already know.
  • Very good course, because I only went to one class.
  • He will destroy you like an academic ninja.
  • Bring a pillow.
  • Your pillow will need a pillow.
  • If I was tested on her family, I would have gotten an A.
  • She hates you already.

posted by: rgregory at 02:28 | link | comments (3) |

Tuesday, January 02, 2007

Some ways to start our responses...

"A beginning is that which does not itself follow anything by causal necessity, but after which something naturally is or comes to be."  Aristotle, Poetics

"My way is to begin with the beginning." Lord Byron, Don Juan

"The speaker is not the biblical Adam, dealing only with virgin and still unnamed objects, giving them names for the first time." Bakhtin, Speech Genres

[The speaker] is not "after all, the first speaker, the one who disturbs the eternal silence of the universe." Bakhtin, Speech Genres

"Every beginning is a response to a prior beginning." Bakhtin

posted by: rgregory at 02:23 | link | comments (1) |

Genre and the New Rhetoric

Kenneth Bruffee, social construction and genre theory.

"knowledge is something that is socially constructed in response to communal needs, goals, and contexts."  "the composing process of texts traditionally regarded as containers of knowledge comes to be seen, far more dynamically, as part of the social process by which that knowledge, 'the world, reality, and facts' are made." Freedman and Medway, eds.



"Genre as Social Action," Carolyn Miller

Criticisms of genre theory:  reductionism, rules, formalism, tiresome and useless taxonomies. 

"Genre" based on the action it is used to accomplish.  The social action.  Connections b/t genre and recurrent situations.  Represents typified rhetorical action.   Classification based on similarity of action.  Rhetorical analysis based on form (syntactics), substance (semantics), and rhetorical act discourse performs (pragmatics). [back to Kinneavy here]   Involves situation and motive and action.  [reminded of Burke here.  Miller also mentions these as Burke's terms here.]  Recognizable forms bound by internal dynamic (according to Jamieson and Campbell).  It's the fusion of all three within a rhetorical situation.  Not just the isolation of one. 

Relationship b/t situation and discourse.  [back to Bitzer here]

connections b/t genre theory and Aristotle:  deliberative, epideictic, forensic discourses.  Have elements common of each (exhortation and dissuasion, accusation and defense, and praise or blame).   Aims (expedience, justice, honor).  Appropriate forms (time, tense, proofs, style).  [connections to Kinneavy here also]

relevance to rhetorical practice.  social action occurs when intention meets effect.

"motives are found within or created by situations and that situations are perceived in terms of motives."

genre based in rhetorical practice, open structure, situated actions.

difference b/t Bitzer and Burke:  motive and exigence.  Motive based on human action.  Exigence based on reaction.

Genres based on recurrent rhetorical situations.   Distinguishes b/t fundamental and perceptual screen.   Exigence is a form of social knowledge.  Exigence is to have a social motive.  Motives--linguistic products. Trying not to create taxonomies.    Genre based in typified rhetorical action.   Combination of situation and social context--situation arises within a social context.   Genre is the convergence of private intentions and social exigencies.


"Anyone for Tennis!" Anne Freadman

Relates the metaphor/simile/allegory of tennis to genre theory.  Learn the rules of genres, output is text.  However, just as in the game, players can plan what they are going to do, in the situation of the game, things might not go exactly according to plan.  Likewise in genres and speech acts.  Just because the rules are planned as typified social action, doesn't mean that the text will carry on exactly as planned.  "Recipes are a genre, but genres are not recipes."

Freadman connects genres to encyclopedias much like Eco does.

Learning discourse and genres much like apprenticeship.  Learning to write means being around writers.  Means practicing writing.  Means knowledge instructor helping students to learn through trial and error.   Genre acquisition can be socially empowering.


"Systems of Genres and the Enactment of Social Intentions," Charles Bazerman

Genres are levers on complicated and dynamic machines that contribute to the consequential social motive sought. 

"A genre exists only in the recognitions and attributions of the users."  Genres don't exist in vacuum w/out social use.

"over a period of time, individuals perceive homologies in circumstances that encourage them to see these as occasions for similar kinds of utterances.  These typified utterances, often developing standardized formal features, appear as ready solutions to similar appearing problems.  Eventually the genres sediment into forms so expected that readers are surprised or even uncooperative if a standard perception of the situation is not met by an utterance of the expected form."

Can't always control audiences' reaction.  Part of social action.


"Observing Genres in Action:  Towards a Research Methodology," Anthony Pare and Graham Smart

Regularities in textual features.  regularities in social roles.  regularities in composing process.  regularities in reading practices. 

"Genre and the Pragmatic Concept of Background Knowledge," Janet Giltrow

Background knowledge and experience w/ genres important to the construction of them.


Genre Theory, John Swales

genre defined as "common communicative purposes" with purposes that in specific environments give rise to specific features.  Also important:  discourse community. 

genre based on 1. communicative events, 2. communicative purposes, 3. genres of prototypicality, 4. nomenclature, 5.

"Discourse communities are soicorhetorical networks that form in order to work towards sets of common goals."

"genres are the properties of the discourse communities." genre identity based on communicative purpose.

Features of discourse communities:  1. common public goals. 2. mechanisms of intercommunication. 3. participatory mechanisms for providing feedback and information. 4. one of more genres utilized by the group to further its public goals 5. specific lexicon. 6. members of expertise.

posted by: rgregory at 02:07 | link | comments |

Monday, January 01, 2007

Sonja Foss's Rhetorical Criticism

Not discussed by Foss--could also examine discourse based on Bakhtin's theory of dialogism, architectonics, chronotope.

Toulmin's theory of argumentation--claim, data, warrant, backing, rebuttal, and qualifier.

Or, while Foss mentions briefly, could examine artifact based on Bitzer's theory of rhetorical situation.

Or, Kinneavy's aims of discourse and modes of discourse--referential, persuasive, literary, expressive

posted by: rgregory at 22:48 | link | comments (7) |