Points of Praxis

My Blog Reflects on Visual Rhetorical Theory and Disability Rhetoric and their Connections to Classical and Contemporary Rhetorical Theory

Since we're "leaving" Burnett's text in my electronic literature class, I wanted to spend a little more time with his discussion on visualization and images in my blog.  Specifically, I'm interested in applying his definition of visualization, "the embodiment and the transformation of information into knowledge and understanding through human activity and the conversion of information and knowledge by humans into material and aesthetic forms" (202), to ultrasound and sonogram images of the fetus in-utero. 

I am still thinking this out as I write, but I'm specifically interested in the ways in which the visualization of the fetus changes the human experience and also how the notion of the "human experience" changes because of such technology.  Specifically, Burnett discusses how medical and scientific images that seem to "peer" into the body challenge notions of "what it means to be flesh and blood" (141).  Burnett also argues that technology (and the images created by such technologies) are considered "impure" and can manipulate "humans and what it means to be human" (141). 

So, how does this relate to the images of the fetus produced with ultrasounds and sonograms?  I'm thinking that if images, as Burnett discusses throughout his book, are spaces of transformation, interpretation, perception, hybridization, then the images of the fetus is, likewise, simply an image that must be interpreted and can be transformed.  After all, an ultrasound machine simply transmits high-frequency sound pulses through a woman's uterus; the pulses bounce off at different rates matter of different densities.  The "bounced back" pulses are then interpreted and programmed to reflect an image on the screen.  What viewers perceive to be the image of the fetus on the computer screen is simply a collection of bits that are shaded according to certain criteria programmed into the computer.  The resulting image appears to be "human" although it really is simply sound waves reconfigured as an image.  After all, sound bounces off of us all the time, but we don't see images of that "bounce back" until the date is given meaning by a computer.   And, then we associate the image reflected on the computer as that of a fetus.

This interpretation raises interesting questions about what it means to be human, as Burnett notes, because how often do parents look at the screen and proclaim, "That's my baby." Or, how often are ultrasound images preserved in baby books as the first "pictures" of the child?  However, the image is simply a collection of interpretable data.  It isn't a baby.  This seems a conflict, like Burnett discusses, between what it means to be human and technology.  In the case of the parent who proclaims "That's my baby," the image is "perceived" to be human, although it isn't.   In this case, the image has become a means of immersion, where parents become apart of the image and the experience.  That image is their baby--there is already a perceived connection and closeness with the image.  Viewing has become a "haze of mediation, experience, and screen" (7).

This distinction is all the more interesting in light of the ways in which ultrasound images have become "tools" for the pro-life movement.  While the image on the screen is simply the interpretation of data, the image becomes human--it is a child in a woman's womb.   However, the image is not really a child.  The image is simply a collection of data that is interpreted to be a child. 

A conflict also arises between technologies--the same scientific advances that offer the experiences of "seeing" a fetus are the same as those offer the experience of aborting a fetus. Ultrasound technologies are considered "positive" when they offer a glimpse of the developing fetus for the parents, but this same ultrasound technology is "negative" when it is to identify the gestational age and development of a fetus in the moments before an abortion.  In this case, again, the image is too "real" and, as is often the case, women seeking an abortion are not allowed to see the ultrasound image in the clinic.  This relates to Burnett's discussion on vantage point:  the "humanity" of the image is "closely related to perspective and attitude."  In this case, while the image is important, so is the position and placement of the viewer.  Again, technology and the images created by it are imbued with human qualities.  From the vantage point of the woman proceeding with a pregnancy, the technology is human.  It shows a woman's child in the development stages.  Likewise from the vantage point of the woman choosing to terminate the pregnancy, the technology is too human.  So human, in fact, that a woman should be shielded from its effects.

Burnett, Ron.  How Images Think.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press.  2005.

posted by: rgregory at 17:40 | link | comments (5) |

Comments:

#1  16 October 2005 - 23:17

 

Rochelle

Ultrasounds are really interesting examples of some of the contradictions and challenges of visualization. It is not so much that we can now see a child before she or he is born, it is the rather extraordinary notion that the image is
a child! This collapse between representation and images is at the core of visualization as a process. The imaginary relationship that parents have with their baby now shifts into a meta-state, commentary upon the image as well commentary upon the real baby.

Visualization is an eruption of the imaginary into processes of perception. It is as if dream worlds collide with reality and produce an unexpected outcome.

Now, the issue of pregnancy and abortion is a useful and important example of the challenges we face with the technology. Clearly, a woman's right to choose needs to be based on more than the image can ever provide and is steeped in contextual issues that far exceed the process of visualization. In that sense there is nothing to fear, in my opinion. However, the rhetorical use of imaging to justify other arguments such as right to life, fail because visualization is also a product of context, who one is and how one has lived one's life.

http://www.eciad.ca/~rburnett/weblog

Mo'nonymous

#2  17 October 2005 - 15:06

 

Thanks so much Dr. Burnett for posting on my blog...

rgregory

#3  21 October 2005 - 03:49

 

Rochelle,

Perhaps any time we can see evidence that renders the theoretical into something real is a moment of revelation. Perhaps what may be more startling than the still image of the fetus is all of the movement taking place within the image. I am interested in how much the movement, the motion impacts our feelings about something. That is what is missing in discussions about images for me.

--Dene

Dene

#4  21 October 2005 - 19:02

 

Absolutely. I think the movement of the image really reinforces our connections between the technological image and its (perceived) humanity. After all, we look at pictures of children all of the time, but when it seems to interact and respond to stimuli...

For example, the 1980's video "The Silent Scream" showed a "real" abortion carried out as it appeared on a sonogram. The images were interpreted by a narrator/doctor so reflect something that actually wasn't there. Specifically, the doctor argued that fetus actually let out a little "scream" at the moment the abortion was carried out. However, the fetus could never have done such a thing--it wouldn't have had vocal cords or even a central nervous system capable of carrying pain impulses. Still, the visual representation of the fetus and its (perceived) movement on the screen was a powerful rhetorical move.

rgregory

#5  24 October 2005 - 22:54

 

Dr. Burnett--

I'm sorry that my response to your comment and email has been so late. And, again, thanks so much for your response.

In response to your reply, I think you made a very good point about the contexts of the rhetorical arguments made with the images. Since every situation is different, one woman might see a baby while another might not relate the fetus she is carrying to the image on the screen. Going more into contexts, I think it is very interesting the ways that the fetus is a visual synchedoche--that the visual of one baby on television relates to the visual of so many others. That although a woman might be considering an abortion, her fetus is (typically) less than 12 weeks along. However, the image often associated or visualized as the fetus is one seen on television and in pictures of a 24+ week fetus. The visual in this case is completely different than the fetus a particular woman might be carrying. Your book really raises some interesting questions.

Thanks again for taking the time to respond to my blog. You seem to be the utmost professional who truly cares about the reception of his works by fellow scholars.

rgregory

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